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the urban–industrial nexus through
Chinese economic zones in Africa
Tom Goodfellow




The relationship between industrialisation and urban development is subject to assumptions based on
experiences in the global North, with little research on how it plays out in countries undergoing urbanisa-
tion and industrialisation today. In the context of recent excitement about China’s role in stimulating an
‘industrial revolution’ in Africa, we examine how Chinese zones in Ethiopia and Uganda are influencing
the urban–industrial nexus. We argue that Chinese zones are key sites of urban–industrial encounter, but
these dynamics are not primarily driven by the government officials that dominate the ‘policy mobilities’
literature, nor by the State-Owned Enterprises usually associated with Chinese activity overseas. Rather,
they are emerging through the activities of inexperienced private Chinese actors who do not even oper-
ate in the worlds of urban policy. Faced with government histories and capacities that vastly differ from
China’s, directly replicating the Chinese experience is virtually impossible; yet the tentative and improvisa-
tional relationships between Chinese firms, African government authorities and other local actors are gra-
dually moulding new urbanisms into shape. The piecemeal bargaining and negotiation that unfolds
through these relationships bridges some of the gaps between industrialisation and planning, but this can-
not compensate for the governance of the urban–industrial nexus at higher scales.
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Introduction
Urbanisation and industrialisation have
been so closely coupled in the European and
North American experience – and more
recently in parts of East Asia – that the rela-
tionship between them rarely comes under
scrutiny. Whether viewed through classical
social science lenses, which suggest that
industrialisation drives urbanisation, or
through more recent suggestions (rooted in
sources as diverse as Jacobs (1969) and
Lefebvre (1970)), that urbanism itself ulti-
mately produces industrialisation, the
association between the two is treated as
automatic. Yet the situation in much of con-
temporary sub-Saharan Africa, where urba-
nisation has been proceeding apace without
significant industrialisation (Gollin et al.,
2016; UNECA, 2017), impels us to
think about this relationship differently. In
the context of a recent surge in manufacturing
investment from China, the African continent
is the site of new encounters between urbani-
sation and industrialisation in spaces where
there is barely any previous urban–industrial
nexus to build upon. If Africa is indeed set to
become the ‘next factory of the world’ (Sun,
2017), what kind of urbanisms are being man-
ufactured in the process – and how?
Increased offshoring by Chinese manufac-
turers in Africa over the past decade has
prompted a wave of cautious optimism about
Africa’s manufacturing potential (Geda et al.,
2018; Lin et al., 2019; Sun, 2017). Between
2003 and 2014, China’s foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) stock in Africa increased from
US$491 million to US$32.4 billion, and by
far the largest number of investments were in
manufacturing (UN-HABITAT, 2018: 109).
Much of the excitement about China’s role in
Africa’s industrial transformation has focused
on job creation, knowledge spillovers and eco-
nomic linkages (Oqubay and Lin, 2019a).
Although the importance of infrastructure
(and its absence) is often emphasised, the
broader urban implications of these industrial
investments are underexplored, reflecting a
general deficit in research on the processes
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One strategy for overcoming Africa’s
infrastructure deficits has been through
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and
Industrial Parks (IPs), which are increasingly
central to Chinese industrial investments in
Africa (Bräutigam and Tang, 2011, 2014;
Oqubay and Lin, 2019a, 2019b). Yet the cre-
ation of zones does not resolve the spatial
challenges of industrialisation; rather, it
opens a new set of questions. IPs and SEZs
are generally sited close to or within existing
urban areas, and the relationship is not
automatically synergistic. The concepts of
SEZs, IPs and other forms of economic zone
can also imply very different kinds of rela-
tionships with urban space and planning
processes.1 The risk of industrial zones
becoming islands that fail to integrate both
spatially and economically, despite contri-
buting to short-run economic growth, has
proved historically to be very real
(Easterling, 2014; Farole, 2011; UNECA,
2017).
Early SEZs in Africa since the 1970s
largely failed to achieve basic objectives
(Bräutigam and Tang, 2011; Farole, 2011).
There are, however, reasons to believe that
Chinese-led SEZs hold greater potential,
especially given China’s own extensive
experience with them and with associated
urban development. In 2006, the Chinese
government decided to support overseas
SEZs, including six in Africa. Progress has
been highly uneven but with pockets of rela-
tive success (Bräutigam and Tang, 2014;
Sun, 2017). These zones have been followed
by a wave of private IPs developed
without government support, which are
barely researched despite bringing substan-
tial change to urban areas across Africa.
In this article, we examine how Chinese
industrial zones in Africa are influencing the
urban–industrial nexus. The intertwined tra-
jectories of industrial development and urba-
nisation in China’s experience have been
well documented (Chen, 1995; Friedmann,
2005; Gu et al., 2017; Walder, 1992; Wu,
2015), but whether and how this experience
is being translated into African contexts
remains uncertain. This is an important issue
given the lack of alignment between indus-
trial policy and urban planning across much
of Africa (UNECA, 2017). As ‘potential test
beds for urban software’ (Easterling, 2014:
28), Chinese zones in Africa are vital sites in
which to examine the making of industrial
urbanism in contemporary Africa.
While most attention paid to large-scale
Chinese activity in Africa is on State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs), private Chinese inves-
tors dominate manufacturing investment
and industrial zone development. In this arti-
cle, we highlight some specific ways in which
private investors are starting to build infra-
structural and spatial connections between
industrial zones and the urban fabric, drawing
partly on China’s experience, but also in
response to the everyday challenges they face.
By paying closer attention to the businesspeo-
ple involved in these ventures – who often
have no previous experience in developing
industrial zones and are simply experimenting
on the ground – we can observe dynamics in
the urban–industrial nexus that are obscured
by the dominant focus on SOEs and Chinese
‘state capital’ (Gu et al., 2016; Lee, 2018).2
We begin by rooting the article concep-
tually in the ‘policy mobilities’ literature, and
specifying our methodology. Following this,
we discuss the very different contexts for
urban–industrial connections in sub-Saharan
Africa and China, before turning to Ethiopia
and Uganda specifically, outlining the
national IP strategy in each country and then
exploring the varying roles of Chinese actors.
This brings us to our core focus, which is the
practices of specific Chinese private investors
and their local interactions. Instead of the
consultants and officials that dominate the
policy mobilities literature, we argue that
these inexperienced private investors are cen-
tral to shaping new forms of improvised
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linkages between industrial zones and urban
development in Ethiopia and Uganda. The
struggles of these investors to succeed and to
negotiate with a range of local and national
actors have drawn together some of the
threads of urbanisation and industrialisation




There is a curious fissure between the litera-
tures on industrial policy learning and urban
policy ‘mobilities’. Urban–industrial policy
coherence and the importance of urban plan-
ning are largely absent from the transnational
industrial policy learning literature, including
where it discusses SEZs (Farole, 2011; Kim
and Nelson, 2000; Oqubay and Ohno, 2019).
Meanwhile, there has been extensive attention
to urban policy in the ‘policy mobilities’ litera-
ture (McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck, 2011;
Robinson, 2015), but with relatively little
attention paid to industrialisation. These two
literatures thus ironically lack the very integra-
tion that was central to the successful urban–
industrial nexus in China.
This disconnect reflects the fact that much
of the work of actively integrating manufac-
turing industry with urban space and infra-
structure happens not at the level of official
government policy, but elsewhere. When
considering how policies might be ‘arrived
at’ in a given location (Robinson, 2015), the
policy mobilities literature largely focuses on
international consultants and other ‘policy
entrepreneurs’, as well as government offi-
cials. However, in the relatively rare exam-
ples of this literature engaging with East
Asia, the role of private enterprises has been
emphasised (Bok and Coe, 2017; Song et al.,
2018). Thus, despite East Asia being associ-
ated with state-driven development, it is
often private entrepreneurs and firms that
do much of the work of translating policy
ideas into new contexts. These individuals
and firms might have no intention of being
agents of policy mobility; any policy mobili-
sation that they enact is merely ‘a value-
added activity that provides possibilities of
profit generation’ (Bok and Coe, 2017: 56).
This prompts us to consider who the
most important agents of mobile interna-
tional knowledge actually are when it comes
to Chinese influence on African industriali-
sation. Although numerous initiatives now
exist for African government officials to
travel to China and learn about its experi-
ences, this policy learning is only part of the
picture, and there are many aspects of the
Chinese experience that African govern-
ments may ignore, consciously or uncon-
sciously. Learning by policy actors unfolds
in the context of powerful pre-existing ideo-
logical and sociopolitical frames that filter
policy-making imaginaries (Peck, 2011;
Zhang, 2012: 2855). Yet private sector actors
operating in Africa generally have no such
political preferences. Consequently, they
often develop forms of local engagement and
policy mutation beyond the scope of national
governments’ industrialisation agendas.
In what follows, we examine these pro-
cesses of learning, translation and mutation
as they are unfolding through Chinese pri-
vate industrial parks in two very different
African contexts. Ethiopia and Uganda were
selected because they both host major
Chinese IPs, but substantially differ both in
terms of governmental commitment to
industrialisation and state control over land.
They also enable us to examine urban–
industrial integration at very different scales,
with Ethiopian IPs being much larger. The
article draws on research conducted between
November 2017 and June 2019 in China,
Ethiopia and Uganda. In China, we inter-
viewed policymakers and international agen-
cies concerned with investment in African
countries. In Ethiopia and Uganda, we inter-
viewed Chinese investors and contractors,
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national and local government representa-
tives, Chinese government agency represen-
tatives and international donors. Overall, we
conducted over 80 semi-structured inter-
views, supplemented by a small-scale ques-
tionnaire survey of 50 workers in Huajian
Light Industry City (HLIC) in Addis Ababa,
stakeholder workshops with UN-HABITAT
in Nairobi in 2018 and in Ethiopia in 2019,
analysis of key government and international
agency documents and observation of IPs in
Uganda and Ethiopia periodically across the
course of a year.
This material was analysed thematically,
during which three particular lines of com-
parison were drawn out: between the condi-
tions of China’s own zone-based urban
development and conditions in our African
cases; between Ethiopian and Ugandan con-
texts and experiences; and between Chinese
private IP investments and the national,
public IP programmes in Ethiopia and
Uganda. Through this multifaceted com-
parative analysis, we were able to inductively
develop our arguments about the signifi-
cance and implications of Chinese IPs for
the urban–industrial nexus in Africa.
The urban–industrial nexus:
Africa and China compared
By ‘urban–industrial nexus’, we refer to the
relationship that industrial developments
such as factories and industrial zones have
with the surrounding urban fabric, for exam-
ple through infrastructures of energy, water,
waste and transport, and the accessibility
and quality of housing for workers. Access
to land and appropriate land use regula-
tions, enabling industries to thrive while
complementing surrounding land uses and
limiting negative externalities, are important
as well – as is the location of industry vis-a-
vis appropriate labour markets. The extent
to which these connections are governed in a
coherent way, and through integrated
policies, varies widely. The mechanics of this
nexus have been subject to surprisingly little
research in the global South, though some
recent studies exist on China (Li and Chen,
2012; Liu et al., 2020) and Africa (Murphy
and Carmody, 2019; Turok, 2014).
There has also been limited attention to
the relationship between urbanisation and
industrialisation as processes, in sub-
Saharan Africa, partly due to assumptions
rooted in historically specific experiences of
the global North. Historically, industrialisa-
tion has often been viewed as the primary
driver of urbanisation, with rural–urban
wage differentials generated through indus-
trial development stimulating migration into
cities (Lewis, 1954). This led late 20th-cen-
tury economists to puzzle over what they
termed ‘over-urbanisation’ in Africa: that is,
urbanisation unmatched by industrial job
opportunities (Davis, 2016). However, closer
attention to the fundamental drivers of
urbanisation globally shows that the link
between urbanisation and industrialisation
is not natural or inevitable (Fox, 2012).
The disjuncture between urban develop-
ment and the extent of industrialisation in
much of the South has become a subject of
significant concern (Gollin et al., 2016;
UNECA, 2017). Limited industrial invest-
ment during the colonial era, followed by
structural adjustment in the 1980s–1990s
alongside the surge in cheap manufacturing
from Asia, caused many African countries
to de-industrialise (Mkandawire and
Soludo, 1999). From 2000 to 2015, the aver-
age decline in manufacturing in Africa as a
share of GDP was 2.3 percentage points
(UNECA, 2017), while in the same period
the level of urbanisation increased from
30% to 40%. Today, many African cities
pose significant obstacles to industrial suc-
cess due to infrastructure deficiencies, lega-
cies of unplanned urban form, complex land
markets and inadequate housing and trans-
port (UNECA, 2017: 122–126).
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Economists increasingly argue that struc-
tural transformation towards manufacturing
is essential for sustained growth and poverty
alleviation in Africa, with SEZs and IPs seen
as important tools for achieving this
(Ajakaiye and Page, 2012; Geda et al., 2018).
Part of the reason for previous SEZ failures
was their lack of strong connections to exist-
ing urban economies (UNECA, 2017). This
was linked to a broader neglect of urban pol-
icy for which Western donors – gripped from
the 1980s by ideas of ‘urban bias’ (Bates,
1981; Lipton, 1977) and a hostility towards
public sector planning – were partly culpable.
Around half of African countries have no
national urban strategy (UCLG Africa and
Cities Alliance, 2018), and those that do exist
are often divorced from economic develop-
ment strategy (Turok, 2015). Over the past
decade, many African countries have returned
to industrial policy (Ajakaiye and Page, 2012;
Whitfield et al., 2015). Yet the dual legacy of
structural adjustment and diminished plan-
ning capacity creates formidable obstacles to
effectively integrating manufacturing industry
with surrounding infrastructure, housing and
land use.
China offers a contrasting experience over
the same period. While it has experienced
varying urban–industrial relationships since
the early rural-based industrialisation under
Mao (Gu et al., 2017), the creation of SEZs
since the late 1970s played an integral cataly-
tic role in both industrialisation and urban
development (Bräutigam and Tang, 2011;
Easterling, 2014; Ren, 2013). The earliest
SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces,
including Shenzhen, charted a remarkable
learning journey, deploying institutional
experiments to maximise the benefits of for-
eign investment. By 1981, these SEZs
accounted for 60% of all FDI in China
(Zeng, 2010).
In the late 1980s, the Shenzhen ‘flagship’
development story gave way to other forms,
including Economic and Technological
Development Zones and High and New
Technology Industrial Development Zones
(Chen, 1995). The later economic zones did
not follow the exact model of Shenzhen, and
some cases such as the Tianjin Economic
and Development Area have been associated
with urban fragmentation (Wang et al.,
2020). However, while levels of urban–
industrial integration vary, the overriding
story is one of relative coherence between
the urban and industrial policies, reflected in
at least two aspects which are missing from
many African contexts and from formal
efforts at ‘policy transfer’.
First, despite a one-party state, there has
been significant decentralisation in the
administration of both urban areas and
SEZs. Although SEZs in China are regu-
lated by the national government, they enjoy
strong governance autonomy. Early SEZs
were granted municipal/sub-provincial sta-
tus, and more recent economic zones are
usually governed by a special commission
directly under local government or a para-
statal company in which local government
holds a large share (Chen, 1995). These
developments substantially increased local
autonomy (Eng, 1997). By the late 1980s,
urban governments enjoyed widespread free-
dom in revenue-raising and engaging flexibly
with FDI. The consequent local autonomy
facilitated capacity transfer between FDI
and the local economy (Walder, 1992).
Much SEZ revenue remains local (up to a
threshold when a proportion may have to be
shared with the provincial government), but
the national government largely refrains
from interfering. SEZs and local govern-
ments have thus grown together symbioti-
cally (Eng, 1997).
Second, planning plays a significant role
throughout (Eng, 1997; Ng and Tang, 2004).
Both industrial and urban land use increased
significantly in the post-1978 era and there
are many territorial tensions to be resolved,
but land-use planning and urban planning
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generally are afforded significant authority
in this arena (Kuang et al., 2016). It has thus
been said that in the post-1978 era the gov-
ernment realigned administration to shift
from a ‘planned economy’ to a ‘planned cit-
ies’ approach (Abramson, 2007).
The above features contrast with many
African contexts, where recent efforts
towards decentralisation have been primar-
ily administrative rather than fiscal, and
planning started to be undermined just as it
was simultaneously being strengthened in
China. Against this diverging background,
many official efforts by Chinese policy
actors to advise African governments on
industrialisation involve assumptions or
oversights that render their efforts ineffective
or irrelevant, as we discuss further below.
Industrial park development in
Ethiopia and Uganda
The recent emphasis in the industrialisation
push in both Ethiopia and Uganda has been
on IPs, rather than other more expansive
forms of SEZ. In terms of functional devel-
opment, IPs in both countries resemble the
earlier stages of China’s Free Manufacturing
Zones and Export Processing Zones (Chen,
2019), which focus on labour-intensive
industries and primarily target job creation
and export-oriented production. Because
some of the IPs in Ethiopia and Uganda
(particularly private Chinese ones) have
‘zone’ in the title, and in practice the terms
are flexible, we here use the generic ‘Chinese
zones’ interchangeably with Chinese IPs.
In contrast to economic zones within
China, which are all administered by local
public agencies, in both Ethiopia and
Uganda we need to distinguish between
national (public) IPs managed by a national
authority, and private zones managed by
private (usually foreign) companies. There
are interesting dynamics between public and
private zones, involving competition but
also an interest in learning from each other –
especially in Ethiopia. In the remainder of
this section, we briefly review the national
IP programmes in each country, before turn-
ing to the role of different kinds of Chinese
actors.
National IP development programmes
Ethiopia provides Africa’s clearest example
of a government that has been committed to
promoting light manufacturing in recent
years, including through IPs. In 2014, the
Industrial Parks Development Corporation
(IPDC) was established to drive forward
national IP development (Oqubay, 2015;
Staritz and Whitfield, 2017; Sun, 2017). Yet
even in the accounts offered by Arkebe
Oqubay – a senior Ethiopian policymaker
since the 1990s – the relationship between
industrial zones, existing urban areas and
urban planning has been a weak link.
Instead of concerted efforts towards policy
integration, cities adjoining the 12 national
IPs are merely ‘expected to prepare master
plans’ to accommodate IPs’ effects (Gebre-
Egziahber and Yemeru, 2019: 798). Research
on Ethiopian IPs has also largely neglected
this issue, focusing mostly on labour rela-
tions and economic linkages (Fei and Liao,
2020; Giannecchini and Taylor, 2018; Lin
et al., 2019; Oqubay and Lin, 2019b; Oya,
2019).
The difficulties in integrating IPs with
urban areas are vividly illustrated by the
case of Hawassa, Ethiopia’s flagship (and
Africa’s largest) IP. The park employed
31,500 workers by December 2019,3 and
when full has the potential to increase the
city population by over 50%, from around
500,000 today to a projected 750,000 by
2035. The lack of a coherent framework for
integrating spatial planning with IP develop-
ment, alongside protracted disputes between
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the municipality and the IPDC on how to
deal with the massive shortfall in workers’
housing, pose huge challenges.4
In Uganda, attention to manufacturing
has been much more fragmented (Whitfield
et al., 2015). A dual track strategy has
emerged where national IP development is
led by the Ugandan Investment Authority
(UIA), while a programme to facilitate ‘free
zones’ is led by the Uganda Free Zones
Authority (UFZA). However, there is no
central agency with the remit and resources
to promote IPs like Ethiopia’s IPDC. UIA
oversees nine parks at various stages of
development – though the only operational
one is Namanve near Kampala, which is still
severely lacking in infrastructure finance.
UFZA aims to help private investors
develop their own export-oriented zones,
but does not actively invest in IPs or source
land. Representatives concede that despite
attempts to learn from China, it is very diffi-
cult to establish large zones due to Uganda’s
widespread private land ownership, and the
agency has little engagement with processes
of planning or urban policy formation.5
Disaggregating Chinese actors in industrial
park development
Before turning specifically to private inves-
tors, it is important to disaggregate the mul-
tiple types of Chinese actors involved in IP
development in the two countries, in varied
roles. Tables 1 and 2 outline the main IPs of
any kind in Ethiopia and Uganda respec-
tively, showing that Chinese actors are
engaged in a range of ways. Overall, we
identify four sets of Chinese actors engaged
in IP development.
First are those that embody China’s ‘state
capital’, that is, SOEs investing in IPs. These
are actually very few. In our cases there are
two SOEs (CCCC and CCECC) actively
investing, both in Ethiopia, and one further
proposed venture involving the Changsha
Government Agency. However, their IPs
remain empty at the time of writing and our
interviews suggest that Chinese SOEs are
reluctant to invest any further themselves.
They took over these parks through specific
arrangements with the Ethiopian govern-
ment that would enable them to maintain
their competitiveness in the construction
business.6 Beyond this, the expectation is
that (as in China’s own experience) invest-
ment will be the role of other, private inves-
tors seeking to use the parks. The second
category of Chinese actors is contractors –
also often SOEs – acting merely in the
capacity of construction firms rather than
investing. These are substantial in number;
Chinese contractors have been involved in
all of the Ethiopian national IPs, for
example.
A third category is policy advisers – the
agents most typically associated with ‘policy
mobility’ – who on a few occasions have
come to African countries specifically to
share learning from Chinese experiences.
These efforts have been relatively limited,
and rarely influential. Of over two dozen IPs
with significant Chinese involvement, only a
couple involved expertise in planning beyond
the production of physical layouts of the
parks by Chinese designers. In Hawassa,
experts from Suzhou IP were invited to share
experiences through a two-year skill transfer
programme. However, both Ethiopian offi-
cials and Chinese advisors suggested that the
transfer was unsuccessful, with one source
even claiming that the experts ‘remained in
their office all the time and did not care
about what’s going on in the park’.7
Another notable attempt at policy ‘trans-
fer’ was the strategy developed by the
Chinese Association of Development Zones
(CADZ) in Ethiopia from 2013 to 2015,
which included proposals for 20 SEZs
throughout the country. This strategy
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Table 1. Industrial parks in Ethiopia and key actors.
Name of industrial zone Location Size (ha) Status Industry clusters Investor/developer Constructor
1 Eastern Industrial Zone Oromia 223 Operational since 2013 Mixed Chinese Jiangsu Qiyuan Information unavailable
2 Bole Lemi Industrial Park 1 Addis Ababa 156 Operational since 2014 Apparel and textiles GoEa Local companies
3 George Shoe Company (single
enterprise)
Oromia 80 Operational since 2015 Leather products George Shoe George Shoe
4 Hawassa Industrial Park SNNPR 140 Operational since 2016 Textiles and garments GoE Chinese SOE
5 Mekelle Industrial Park Tigray 75 Operational since 2017 Textiles and apparel GoE Chinese SOE
6 Kombolcha Industrial Park Amhara 75 Operational since 2017 Textiles and apparel GoE Chinese SOE
7 Adama Industrial Park Oromia 100 Operational since 2018 Textiles and apparel, and machinery
and equipment
GoE Chinese SOE
8 Jimma Industrial Park Oromia 75 Completed in 2019 Textiles and apparel GoE, recently commissioned to
Chinese Huajian
Chinese SOE
9 Debre-Birhan Amhara 100 Completed in 2019 Textiles and garments, agro-
processing
GoE Chinese SOE
10 Bahir-Dar Industrial Park Amhara 75 Completed in 2020 Garments and apparel GoE Chinese SOE
11 Huajian Light Industry City Addis Ababa 138 Partially operational Garments and apparel Chinese Huajian Local companies
12 Kingdom Industrial Park (single
enterprise)
Oromia 32 Operational Textiles and apparel Chinese Zhejiang Jinda N/A
13 Sunshine Adama Park (single
enterprise)
Oromia 80 Operational Textiles and apparel Chinese Jiangsu Sunshine N/A
14 Vogue Industrial Park (single
enterprise)
Tigray 150 Partially operational Textiles and apparel Emirati Vogue International N/A
15 Dire Dawa Industrial Park Dire Dawa 150 Under construction Garments, apparel and textiles GoE Chinese SOE
16 Kilinto Industrial Park Addis Ababa 279 Under construction Pharmaceuticals GoE Chinese SOE
17 Bole Lemi Industrial Park 2 Addis Ababa 181 Under construction Apparel and textiles GoE Chinese SOE
18 DBL (single enterprise) Tigray 78 Under construction Textiles and garments Bangladeshi DBL N/A
19 CCCC Arerti Industrial Park Amhara 100 Under construction Building materials CCCC (SOE) Chinese SOE
20 Dire Dawa CCECC Industrial Park Dire Dawa 370 Under construction N/A CCECC (SOE) Chinese SOE
21 Adama Hunan Industria Park Oromia 122 Under construction Agricultural machinery Changsha Government Agency
(SOE) with Exim Bank Loan (not
yet committed)
Chinese SOE
Notes: This format is compiled with information from the websites of the IPDC and EIC, complemented with interviews with Ethiopian Investment Commission officials and
Chinese investors, between 2018 and 2020. See Industrial Parks Development Corporation (n.d.). a GoE (Government of Ethiopia) is financing the public parks with support












Table 2. Industrial parks in Uganda and key actors.
Name of industrial zone Location Size (acres) Status Industrial clusters Investor/developer Contractor
1 Kampala Industrial and
Business Park
Namanve, near Kampala 2200 Partially operational Mixed GoU Information unavailable
2 Luzira Industrial and
Business Park





Kampala 45 Partially operational Mixed GoU Information unavailable
4 Jinja Industrial and Business
Park




5 Kasese Industrial and
Business Park




6 Soroti Industrial and
Business Park




7 Mbarara SME Park 12 Operational Food processing GoU Information unavailable
8 Shandong Industrial Park Kampala 10.3 Partially operational Mixed Chinese Shandong Chinese Private Company
9 Tiantang Industrial Park Mukono, Central Region 33 Partially operational Mixed Chinese Tiantang Group Chinese Tiantang Group
10 Sino-Uganda Mbale
Industrial Park




11 Liaoshen Industrial Park Nakaseke, Central Region 642 Partially operational Mixed Chinese Zhang Group Chinese Zhang Group
12 Uganda–China
(Guangdong) Free Zone of
International Co-operation
Tororo, Eastern Region 600 Partially operational Mining Chinese Dongsong Chinese Dongsong
Notes: There are no identified IPs in Uganda developed by non-Chinese foreign companies. There are other IPs planned by GoU but no physical development has taken
place, thus they are not included in the table.













explicitly discusses the relationship between
urbanisation and industrialisation, propos-
ing to ‘shape a SEZ more like a township
than a mere industrial park’ (CADZ, 2015:
25). It has not been adopted, however. In
the specific case of Dire Dawa – which dif-
fers from other Ethiopian secondary cities in
having ‘chartered city’ status – CADZ also
developed a SEZ Master Plan that is actively
being used to guide investment in and
around Dire Dawa. Yet it is unclear whether
the broader SEZ will materialise, beyond the
existing IP; local planners themselves indi-
cate a lack of capacity to implement these
plans.8 Aside from this one case, the
Ethiopian government was concerned about
the expansive spatial and governance impli-
cations of the SEZ concept, hence settling
instead on an IP-based strategy (Robi, forth-
coming). In Uganda, several plans for spe-
cific new SEZs have also been developed by
Chinese investors and advisors, but again
with little prospect for realisation given
Uganda’s governance structures.
The fourth category is private investors.
As we will now argue, despite an ongoing
tendency to associate Chinese activities in
Africa with large SOEs, it is actually private
actors we must look to for the most signifi-
cant IP investments and associated learning
and influence regarding the urban–industrial
nexus. In contrast with the hesitant steps by
Chinese state capital, private Chinese invest-
ment into African IPs is thriving (note that
all Chinese firms listed in Tables 1 and 2 are
private unless otherwise stated). As well as
being much more involved in African manu-
facturing generally (UN-HABITAT, 2018),
Chinese private enterprises are far more
active than SOEs when it comes to investing
in IPs and drawing other investors into
them.
A closer look at private investors across
both countries reveals a surprising shared
characteristic: none have had direct partici-
pation in SEZs or IPs in China. This has sig-
nificant implications for their capacity to
convey policies from the Chinese SEZ expe-
rience, because they have not themselves
been part of it. Table 3 provides an overview
of the career trajectories of some key Chinese
IP developers in Ethiopia and Uganda, illus-
trating both their diversity and a common
lack of background in Chinese zones.
The narratives in Table 3, selected
because the actors concerned have devel-
oped some of the most significant foreign-
owned IPs in the two countries, demonstrate
that they were private entrepreneurs who
decided to invest in IPs quite spontaneously.
With the exception of Eastern Industrial
Zone (EIZ), none received any Chinese state
support,9 and none had prior experience of
developing and managing economic zones.
As they moved from other sectors into the
complex position of IP management, they
adopted a range of complex new roles,
including acting as intermediaries between
African government agencies and other for-
eign private businesses. This inexperience
meant they had limited knowledge of the
impacts that IPs can have on surrounding
areas – which can be dramatic and multifa-
ceted. As well as the intensification of devel-
opment in nearby towns or neighbourhoods,
the detrimental environmental effects can be
severe. Evidence of contamination of rivers
close to EIZ, for example, sparked particular
concern. In all cases outlined in Table 3,
expertise in planning and integrating IPs
was deficient on both the Chinese and
African sides. Most attempts at integration
have been ad hoc, taking place in the
absence of clear planning or government
support, severely limiting the prospects for
conventional ‘policy transfer’. However, pri-
vate firms have drawn on experiences from
China in idiosyncratic ways to innovate
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Table 3. Chinese private park investors/managers in Uganda and Ethiopia.





223 Lu Qiyuan Lu Qiyuan went to Ethiopia in 2006 and established a cement factory. Around this time,
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce released its call for Chinese overseas SEZs. Qiyuan
and his brothers put in a bid and founded the Eastern Industrial Zone in 2007 as the
first industrial park in Ethiopia. Despite some delays, it went on to become a highly
diversified industrial park with no particular industry specialism. Although considered
the least successful of the Chinese overseas SEZs in the early 2010s (Bräutigam and
Tang, 2014), by 2017 there had been a major turnaround and it was considered among
the top three Chinese overseas SEZs globally.10 They are now planning the second







Huajian (a successful Chinese shoe manufacturer) went to Ethiopia in the early 2010s,
establishing a factory within the Eastern Industrial Zone. Huajian became the largest
tenant in EIZ, producing 88% of its exports by 2017 (Lin et al., 2019: 810) and becoming
Ethiopia’s biggest private employee in 2012. This success led Huajian to build its own
industrial park on land leased from Lebu Sub-City government in Addis Ababa. Huajian’s
employment number peaked at 7000 in 2016–2017 (split between the two industrial




260 Zhang Hao Zhang Hao went to Uganda in the early 2000s to participate in Uganda–China trade
activities after college. Over time, his family built close relations with elites, who
encouraged him to ‘invest, not just trade’ in Uganda. He invested in a hotel and
restaurant, a security business and real estate. Through the hotel/restaurant investment,
he got to know the President’s brother, General Salem Saleh. This led in 2015 to the
founding of Liaoshen Industrial Park on the General’s land, now among the most






Zhang Jianmin went to Africa in the early 2000s as an accountant for a Chinese
company. He opened a garment factory in Uganda shortly after working in Mali, Senegal
and Gambia. He bought the land for Shandong Industrial Park in 2011. At its peak, the




13.4 Zhang Zhigang Zhang Zhigang came to Uganda in 2002 after visiting Tanzania, and started his own
business there. He had owned restaurants, a steel factory, a furniture workshop and an












forms of urban integration through gradual
processes of learning and negotiation.
Tentative urban policy learning:
‘Crossing the river by feeling the
stones’
It is worth re-emphasising that in our
African case studies, local authorities pos-
sess nothing like the level of power and
resources devolved to local governments in
the Chinese experience of SEZ-led urbanisa-
tion after 1978. Power in Ethiopia has
always been highly centralised, despite its
contemporary federal structure (Markakis,
2011). Although Uganda has undergone
extensive decentralisation since the 1990s,
this has fragmented administration without
substantial autonomy or revenue-raising
capacity (Green, 2015). Weak and under-
resourced local government makes it very
difficult to respond to the urban challenges
accompanying the development of IPs or
other economic zones. Such zones are usually
built in sparsely populated areas, with rela-
tively undeveloped infrastructure; yet when
focused on labour-intensive manufacturing,
IPs often generate rapid local population
growth and a range of associated pressures.
Ethiopia’s EIZ houses over 90 factories
and hired 14,700 people at its peak, most of
whom are based in the nearby towns of
Dukem and Bishoftu. HLIC – a private zone
whose grand title and boot-shaped design
(see Figure 1) underline the private investor’s
ambition to make what is currently just an
industrial park into a multifunctional urban
area – employed over 3600 workers in 2018.
Liaoshen IP in Uganda (Figure 2) is still
under construction, but in addition to 1200
employees working in a ceramics factory, a
new cement factory aims to employ 2000
workers within months of opening. If new
workers move to the neighbouring urban
centre of Kapeeka, currently home to just
3000 households,11 this could produce a
massive proportional increase in population.
Despite the limits of organised policy
transfer programmes, individual private
Chinese IPs have become sites of experimen-
tation in their relationship with urban devel-
opment. One aspect of this concerns housing
– a major concern in virtually all the IPs
considered here, with a significant gender
dimension as the majority of factory work-
ers are women. In Ethiopia, land use poli-
cies initially prohibited mixed use
development within IPs, and consequently
the first zones offered no housing. Some
firms in EIZ offer shuttle buses instead
from nearby towns where urban infill
development and the strain on infrastruc-
ture are intensifying.12 There has also been
significant private housing construction
close to HLIC, where rents are reportedly
skyrocketing.13 However, HLIC is the first
IP in Ethiopia to provide workers’ accom-
modation within the park, drawing directly
on Chinese experiences after its managers
persuaded the authorities to allow mixed
use inside. In early 2018, about 1400 work-
ers lived in dormitories inside the zone.
Although in some respects this contributes
to the zone’s enclavic nature, the accom-
modation was something that factory
workers appreciated more than most
aspects of their low-wage jobs, rating rela-
tively highly features such as privacy, com-
fort and bathing and toilet facilities in the
dormitories.14
A second important area of private inves-
tors’ influence, with more of a direct effect
on policy and law, relates to land manage-
ment and tenure. EIZ’s managers wanted to
lease out land parcels to attract tenants, as is
normal in the Chinese experience – but pri-
vate sub-leasing was prohibited by existing
land regulations (Fei and Liao, 2020).
Ethiopian government resistance to sub-
leasing in a context where land is so sensitive
was substantial. To overcome this, Qiyuan
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Group engaged in what one senior represen-
tative termed ‘hundreds of pleas to different
levels of government and millions of meet-
ings’, as well as study visits to China, in
order to acquire a letter from the Ministry
of Industry to allow them to experiment
with leasing land as a ‘special case’. Making
sub-division a standard practice required
further negotiations, through which Qiyuan
also successfully lobbied for the extension of
the tax exemption period for investors. The
whole process of negotiation took almost
three years,15 leading to the 2015 Industrial
Parks Proclamation. Sub-division is now
legal, and it is widely believed that Qiyuan’s
efforts to maximise the potential of EIZ
Figure 1. Huajian Light Industry City and Jemo area.
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played a key role in shaping Ethiopia’s pol-
icy framework for IP development (Fei and
Liao, 2020).
Despite this, Chinese IP investors’ prac-
tices and ideas are not always considered as
contributing to development in surrounding
areas, and communication problems between
investors and local authorities endure. In
Uganda, district planners (who are nomin-
ally responsible for planning in Kapeeka
Sub-County, where Liaoshen IP is located)
complain that the IP bypasses them by nego-
tiating development plans directly and often
informally with national government. This is
exacerbated by close personal relations
between the IP owner and Ugandan first
family. However, the owner argues that he
has attempted to support local planning but
faced serious challenges. Although the IP
itself has detailed plans, there was no area
plan for Kapeeka Sub-County for its plans
to integrate into.16 Amid growing concerns
about the park’s impact – including in rela-
tion to waste – the local authority enlisted
Kampala-based consultants to develop a
Sub-County plan, and found that the district
authorities had little knowledge of the IP
and few if any staff had even visited.17 They
also reported intense land speculation in the
wider area as land value increased in
response to the park’s activity, amplifying
the challenge of land development outrun-
ning local planning. The sense that powerful
actors are transforming the area has pro-
duced a climate of suspicion in Kapeeka,
and negative local attitudes towards Chinese
investment and labour practices (Wyrod,
2019). The weak and strained relations
Figure 2. Kapeeka and Liaoshen Industrial Park.
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between district authorities and Chinese
investors provide a striking contrast with the
tight local bargaining between local officials
and foreign capital that shaped industrial
urbanism in China (Eng, 1997).
In the context of these difficulties, small
steps towards integration are taken as the
relationship between the IP and surrounding
urbanisation is improvised on a day-to-day
basis. The Zhang family at Liaoshen increas-
ingly realise that local development and
urban integration matter, and have devel-
oped several initiatives to build links with
Kapeeka town. These include social initia-
tives such as the organisation of football
games between Chinese factories and the
local community, but also nascent urban
environmental and economic initiatives
including cleaning streets, planting trees and
encouraging local motorcycle-taxi riders to
diversify livelihoods through recycling activi-
ties.18 These developments unconsciously
replicate, albeit on a smaller scale, some of
the ways in which early SEZ developers in
China took on new responsibilities to sup-
port development in surrounding areas. In
Shekou, Shenzhen’s first economic zone,
local infrastructure weaknesses led the zone
developer to invest in schools and hospitals
around the zone (Lin et al., 2019: 820).
Unfortunately, developments in Kapeeka
are also replicating some forms of social and
spatial inequality that accompanied Chinese
industrial urbanism (Eng, 1997; Wyrod,
2019).
Meanwhile, efforts to inculcate urban
industrial norms and labour discipline
through rituals of hard work, punctuality
and individual betterment are evident in all
the zones – particularly those involving
Huajian. Workers in HLIC assemble every
morning at 7.20 am for a briefing, commen-
cing work by 8 am and working until
5.50 pm, with a one-hour lunch break and
three meals provided onsite. Each worker is
given a Chinese name, with meanings that
correspond to words such as ‘development’,
‘efficiency’ and ‘cooperation’, as well as the
names of cities.19
The fact that local government planning
and infrastructure provision are particularly
weak for private IPs often forces them to
negotiate with local authorities in unex-
pected ways. In both countries, the main
government agencies that IP owners need to
deal with for licensing, regulation and taxa-
tion are national. Yet when it comes to daily
concerns about energy, water, transport and
waste management, neither national utilities
nor local authorities are able to provide
what they require. This has led EIZ to build
its own electricity supply and distribution
infrastructure, which necessitates dealing
with local authorities to acquire land, source
labour and arrange contractors. In HLIC,
after losing patience with waiting for the
government to pave the main road running
through the zone and linking it to the ring
road, Huajian decided to widen and pave
this road themselves (see Figure 1).20
Rather than these infrastructural invest-
ments taking place through a framework
guided by government, investors usually
have to feel their way. Interestingly, in work-
ing closely with the Oromo regional govern-
ment as well as the federal government, the
Chinese managers of EIZ in Ethiopia per-
form a role that is lacking in the govern-
ment’s own national IP programme.
Centralised decision-making within IPDC,
as well as Ethiopia’s fraught ethno-political
context, have inhibited smooth inter-
governmental working regarding the
national IPs.21 However, the Chinese private
IPs can (and need to) position themselves
neutrally between the different stakeholders
to maximise their prospects for success. In
discussing his relationship with the Oromia
government, a senior EIZ figure contrasted
local government capacities with those in
China, but also emphasised the relationship-
building and sense of influence:
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If it were China 50 years ago and a foreign
investor came here to operate an industrial
park, the city government would be so thrilled,
offering all kinds of policy advantages, learn-
ing actively from the practice and making
plans surrounding the park. In Ethiopia, how-
ever, the progress is much slower and the
impact smaller. Despite that, we have seen
progress . We are actually in conversation
with the government, suggesting a merger of
Dukem and [Bishoftu]. We are proposing an
industrial city – a satellite city. Last week we
brought this idea to the table of Abdulaziz,
who is the Vice President of the Oromia region
. He is very interested in this idea. Ten years
ago when we came to Dukem it was still a very
small village. Now we are looking for design
institutes in China to make a 25 km2 urban
plan for the government.22
More generally, unlike in China where local
authorities provided resources and services
to IPs, in our African cases the IP investors’
local engagements are more about negotiat-
ing with public authorities as brokers and
gatekeepers. The complexities of local nego-
tiation are well illustrated by the case of
Shandong IP in Kampala, where securing a
land title and working around land use regu-
lations necessitated extensive negotiation,
and both formal and informal payments.
The outcomes of such relationship-building
efforts with local authorities are generally
tentative and uncertain. Yet they are to
some extent producing new forms of urban–
industrial integration that weakly echo –
though substantially differ from – China’s
own experience.
While policy ‘mobility’ may be impossible
in this context, Chinese park owners and
local authorities are, therefore, periodically
‘arriving at’ elements of a new urban–
industrial nexus through their private, indi-
vidual practices. In contrast to ideas of neo-
colonialism, this is partly because these
Chinese zones are not strategically planted
in Africa to expand Chinese state capitalism.
Rather, they involve entrepreneurs
practising the most important lesson from
industrialisation in China: learning by doing,
or – to use Deng Xiaoping’s famous meta-
phor about China’s own development –
‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ –
and in so doing improvising new forms of
urban–industrial linkage.
Conclusion: Striving for a new
urban–industrial nexus
This article has explored the extent to which
new urban–industrial connections are
unfolding through Chinese industrial zones
in Africa, but primarily not through conven-
tional forms of policy mobility. Most inves-
tors developing IPs in Africa have very
limited experience in Chinese IPs, and while
often exposed to ‘best practice’ stories from
China find themselves faced with vastly dif-
ferent institutional environments. Our two
case study countries vary significantly in
their emphasis on industrialisation, yet in
both cases the coordination between central
and local government agencies, and the
powerful role of the latter as drivers of
urban–industrial evolution, are absent.
However, as our examples show, these
challenges lead investors to search for ways
to either change policies or develop their
own practices in the absence of them. Rather
than official policy learning processes, we
find that the steepest learning curve is that
of the Chinese entrepreneurs themselves.
Faced with government histories and capaci-
ties that vastly differ from China’s, investors’
influence on urban–industrial integration
can only unfold through the slow and incre-
mental processes of responding to ever-
changing opportunities and constraints, as
the relationship between firms and local
authorities gradually moulds new urbanisms
into shape.
These experiences illustrate some limita-
tions of the policy mobilities literature,
which focuses primarily on the active
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mobilisation of policy ideas rather than how
policies filter through practices – and specifi-
cally the practices of profit-seeking investors
with only a distant connection to the experi-
ences from ‘home’ that they ultimately try to
reconstitute. While McCann (2011) and oth-
ers discuss the banal practices of consul-
tants, we put the spotlight on the banal
practices of inexperienced zone managers
who do not even operate in the worlds of
urban policy and are, in general, not particu-
larly interested in mobilising it. As one man-
ager involved in the long negotiations
leading up to the Ethiopian Industrial Parks
Proclamation noted, ‘We didn’t push them
to build the [Industrial Parks] law. It was all
the issues and challenges we met that drove
them to realise there must be a law.’ He then
noted that ‘of course, the law didn’t solve all
the problems at once . we are still facing
new challenges every day’.23 Through bar-
gaining with local governments and drawing
piecemeal on Chinese experiences, attempts
to overcome these challenges gradually gen-
erate negotiated solutions, however limited
they might be, which are producing new
urban–industrial landscapes.
Moreover, while prospects for formal pol-
icy transfer appear limited, Chinese IPs are
having a further impact through their role as
competitors to national IP programmes.
Although beyond the scope of this article to
discuss in depth, Chinese IP owners have
concerns about favourable taxation and
infrastructure provision in national IPs (par-
ticularly in Ethiopia), leading them to strive
to provide better infrastructure and services
themselves in order to attract investors, and
to regularly propose new ideas to the gov-
ernment. The Chinese zones are therefore
evolving through dynamic, competitive rela-
tionships with those supported by the
national government.
Through these processes, new forms
of urban–industrial nexus are being impro-
vised. As Easterling (2014: 40) notes, zones
develop their own ‘peculiar forms of urban-
ity’. Whether through housing provision,
transport links, recycling initiatives or just
bargains struck by investors with local polit-
ical actors to maintain goodwill, these
Chinese IPs play a role in shaping African
urbanisms. Some Chinese investors strive for
more direct influence than this – for example
in the case of Qiyuan’s proposed ‘industrial
city’ merger of Dukem and Bishoftu.
Although there are significant physical and
administrative obstacles to realising such
visions, the fact that these discussions are
happening is pushing forward the conversa-
tion about urban–industrial integration.
Some observers argue that Ethiopia’s pub-
licly owned IPs are more likely to facilitate
internal economic linkages than private
ones (Gebre-Egziahber and Yemeru, 2019;
Giannecchini and Taylor, 2018). We high-
light a different dynamic, suggesting that it
is through private Chinese IPs that the pros-
pects for urban integration may be greater,
both through partial emulation of China’s
experience and through investors’ growing
consciousness that they must foster better
links with surrounding urban areas to
survive.
This is not to deny deep and enduring
problems relating to these zones, including
the question of industrial waste. It is clear
that improvising the urban–industrial nexus
in this way cannot substitute for broader
integration at the level of governance and
policy. More generally, it remains debatable
how far African countries should be basing
their approach on the Chinese experience,
which was replete with land disputes and
environmental degradation (Fei and Liao,
2020; Lin et al., 2019). While there is much
to be learned from China about the relative
autonomy of both SEZs and the local gov-
ernments they bargained with, these also
come with their own risks in our African
case studies – especially given the lack of
experience of IP managers and the complex
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ethnic politics that was absent in China.
Countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda
must and will continue to plot their own
paths as they seek to industrialise. But in the
meantime, it is clear that new forms of
urbanism indirectly influenced by China’s
experience will continue being manufactured
on the ground, as investors and their author-
ities feel their way across the river.
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1. The term ‘SEZ’ is often used generically to
cover Export Processing Zones, Enterprise
Zones and Free Trade Zones – all of which
involve bounded geographical areas with
their own regulatory regime (Easterling,
2014; Farole, 2011).
2. Goodfellow and Huang (2020) for our own
exploration of Chinese ‘state capital’ in rela-
tion to urban infrastructure in Ethiopia and
Uganda.
3. Presentation by academics at Hawassa
University, 22 January 2021.
4. Discussions at stakeholder workshop,
Hawassa, 26 June 2019.
5. Interview with UFZA officials, 18 October 2018.
6. Interview with a Chinese manager from
CCECC, 19 March 2018.
7. Interviews with the IPDC, EIC and Chinese
state-owned companies, between November
2017 and November 2018.
8. Interviews with the IPDC and local planners
in Dire Dawa, between March and April
2018.
9. Interview with Tang Xiaoyang, 9 October
2017.
10. Interview with Tang Xiaoyang, 8 October
2017.
11. Wyrod (2019) argues that Liaoshen was
partly funded by loans from the Liaoning
provincial government, but our later
research found that despite the province
committing to provide support, this never
materialised.
12. Multiple interviews between 2018 and 2019
with Chinese managers of industrial parks
and factory workers.
13. Interview with HLIC manager, 5 November
2019.
14. Findings from survey with workers,
February 2019. In early 2018, strikes in
Ethiopia’s industrial parks increased partly
due to the ongoing turbulence and ethnic
tensions in Ethiopia. This had major conse-
quences for HLIC, and they asked workers
to leave the dormitories. On a return visit in
June 2019, we found the dormitories almost
entirely empty.
15. Interviews with EIZ Vice President, 19
January 2018, and EIC Manager, 6 August
2018.
16. Interview with consultant working on local
planning, 11 May 2018.
17. Interview with consultant working on local
planning, 11 May 2018. Wyrod (2019)
argues that a culture of secrecy surrounding
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Chinese investments in the area led to wide-
spread ignorance at the district level about
current and future plans.
18. Interview with the park owner and local
representatives.
19. Interview with Huajian manager, 1
December 2018.
20. Interview with Huajian manager, November
2019.
21. Discussion at stakeholders’ workshops in
Addis Ababa and Hawassa, June 2019.
22. Interview, 29 January 2018.
23. Interview, January 2018.
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